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Abstract
In the past few years, Generative Adversarial Networks
(GANs) have dramatically advanced our ability to represent
and parameterize high-dimensional, non-linear image mani-
folds. As a result, they have been widely adopted across a va-
riety of applications, ranging from challenging inverse prob-
lems like image completion, to problems such as anomaly de-
tection and adversarial defense. A recurring theme in many
of these applications is the notion of projecting an image
observation onto the manifold that is inferred by the genera-
tor. In this context, Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) has
been the most popular approach, which essentially optimizes
for a latent vector that minimizes the discrepancy between a
generated image and the given observation. However, PGD
is a brittle optimization technique that fails to identify the
right projection (or latent vector) when the observation is
corrupted, or perturbed even by a small amount. Such cor-
ruptions are common in the real world, for example images
in the wild come with unknown crops, rotations, missing pix-
els, or other kinds of non-linear distributional shifts which
break current encoding methods, rendering downstream ap-
plications unusable. To address this, we propose corruption
mimicking – a new robust projection technique, that utilizes
a surrogate network to approximate the unknown corrup-
tion directly at test time, without the need for additional
supervision or data augmentation. The proposed method
is significantly more robust than PGD and other compet-
ing methods under a wide variety of corruptions, thereby
enabling a more effective use of GANs in real-world ap-
plications. More importantly, we show that our approach
produces state-of-the-art performance in several GAN-based
applications – anomaly detection, domain adaptation, and
adversarial defense, that benefit from an accurate projection.
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1. Introduction
Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) [20] have been
widely adopted in part due to their ability to parameterize
complex, high-dimensional, non-linear image manifolds. As
a result, they have been effective in several applications rang-
ing from super resolution [35] and image editing [44, 57],
to image-to-image translation [60, 37], etc. Additionally, an
accurate parameterization of the image manifold provides
a powerful regularization – sometimes referred as a genera-
tive prior – for a range of problems such as defense against
adversarial attacks [48, 27], anomaly detection [6, 58], and
compressive sensing [52]. Despite the variabilities in their
goals and formulations, an overarching requirement in all
these applications is the ability to project an image observa-
tion onto the image manifold at test time.
Projecting onto an image manifold essentially involves an
encoding step to project onto the latent space of a generator,
followed by a decoding step to obtain the image from the
image manifold. While the latter is carried out using a pre-
trained generator model (e.g. convolutional neural networks
or CNNs), the former step is typically implemented using
two distinct family of approaches: (a) Projected gradient
descent (PGD): a simple, yet powerful, latent space opti-
mization strategy that minimizes the discrepancy between
an observed sample, and the best estimate of that sample
from the generator [57, 48]; and (b) Coupling GAN with
an explicit encoder: Techniques such as, BiGAN [16] and
ALI [17], include an additional network that explicitly pro-
vides a latent space representation for an image. This broad
class of approaches also encompasses other generative mod-
eling techniques such as variational autoencoders (VAEs)
[31], [33, 12].
Though these techniques have been shown to provide effec-
tive projections, they are easily broken and fail when the
sample to be projected has undergone even minor distribu-
tional shifts compared to the training data, for e.g. shifts
like simple corruptions, missing pixels, translations, rota-
tion or scale changes etc. Inferencing in the latent space of
GANs has gained a lot of attention recently [1, 5, 2] with
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Figure 1: Demonstration of the alternating optimization process. Though initialized randomly, the corruption-mimicking
network effectively guides the search in the latent space of the generator to produce an estimate of the true image. In this
example from the FFHQ dataset [30], the observed image is a cropped (zoom in) version of the ground truth.
the advent of high-quality GANs such as BigGAN [14],
and StyleGAN [30], thus strengthening the need for robust
projections. While existing solutions such as unsupervised
image-to-image translation [60, 37] have been remarkably
successful in modeling complex distributional shifts across
image domains, they rely on the availability of a large set of
samples from the two domains. In contrast, we are interested
in robustness to simpler distribution shifts such as affine
transformations, corruptions or missing information, that
necessitate robust projections even when very few samples
are available from the corrupted domain at test time.
In this paper, we propose MimicGAN, a test-time ap-
proach for projecting images into the latent space of pre-
trained generative models like GANs such that the decoder
remains robust to a wide range of distribution shifts. Our
main contribution is the process of corruption-mimicking
which uses a surrogate neural network to mimic the corrup-
tion process, while simultaneously computing the projection.
Given a small number of observations, we perform an al-
ternating optimization to train the surrogate conditioned on
the current best estimate of projections from the generator,
followed by optimization in the latent space to identify the
best projections conditioned on the current estimate of the
surrogate network. Since the surrogate is a shallow network,
and a generative prior acts as a powerful regularizer, robust
projection can be achieved with as few as 2 samples in some
cases, or as many as required by the complexity of the appli-
cation. Importantly, because we estimate the corruption on
the fly, MimicGAN does not need to know, in advance, how
the images have been corrupted, or any prior assumptions on
the type of distribution shift that has occurred. The alternat-
ing optimization procedure of MimicGAN is demonstrated
in Figure 1.
Main Findings We observe that corruption mimicking
leads to projections that are highly robust to changes in scale,
translation, and rotation; to missing or partial information,
and to domain shifts across similar datasets. It needs to be
emphasized that the robustness is not achieved by using any
kind of data augmentation strategies, but rather as a conse-
quence of the corruption-mimicking, while keeping all other
conditions the same. Broadly, MimicGAN demonstrates
robustness to the class of functions that can be expressed
by the surrogate network considered. Moreover, PGD is a
special case of MimicGAN when the surrogate network is
assumed to be the identity function and this simplification
leads to highly sub-optimal projections in all applications
considered.
Contributions
1. We propose a robust version of the popularly adopted
PGD approach and its variants called MimicGAN, that
achieves robustness across a wide variety of test-time cor-
ruptions such as scaling, rotation, and missing or partial
information.
2. We propose a corruption mimicking surrogate network
that estimates unknown distributional shifts or corruptions
on the fly, resulting in a single algorithm that works across
a wide range of test-time distribution shifts, without any
prior knowledge.
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3. Using comprehensive experimental evaluation, we show
that MimicGAN is significantly more robust in terms of
projection error compared to several competitive encoding
techniques trained on the same data, with no additional
supervision.
4. We demonstrate significant performance improvements
with MimicGAN in applications benefitting from accu-
rate projections: adversarial defense, anomaly detection,
domain adaptation, and adapting GANs across datasets
(e.g. MNIST[34], USPS hand written digits, CelebA [39],
FFHQ-Thumbnails [30], LFW [11]).
2. Related Work
MimicGAN bridges the gap between two diverse yet
related GAN-based methods in literature. On the one hand,
a growing number of applications rely on using the image
manifold as a powerful regularizer for inverse problems,
adversarial defense, anomaly detection etc. On the other
hand, GAN-style training has emerged as a powerful tool
for image-to-image translation, that are able to map across
very complex distributional shifts. MimicGAN enjoys the
merits of both approaches, wherein it is highly effective at
leveraging the image manifold for adversarial defense, while
also modeling the image translation problem as computing
projections onto the manifold. In this section, we will briefly
review the current art in the two broad classes of approaches
and present comparisons to the proposed MimicGAN.
Image-to-Image Translation While several recent tech-
niques have been proposed to handle very complex distribu-
tional shifts, such as unpaired image to image translations
[60, 37], Pix2Pix[28] etc., they involve training networks
that are able to map from one distribution to the other. More
recently, Non Adversarial Mappings (NAMs) [24, 25] have
shown preliminary evidence to find translations across do-
mains without adversarial training. NAMs are conceptually
similar to our approach, since they parameterize the distri-
bution shift by a neural network that relies on a pre-trained
generator. However, their approach expects a large set of
observations (over 2000, [24]) for a type of corruption, and
as a result needs to be re-trained each time. Further, none
of the existing image-to-image translation techniques effec-
tively leverages a GAN for projection, which is the primary
focus of this work. For example, it is not clear how they
could be used for applications, such as, adversarial defense
or anomaly detection, because of their large observed data
requirement. Our goal is to perform robust projection at the
test time, that can work with as few as a 5-10 observations.
Consequently, MimicGAN is able to project robustly across
several distribution shifts using the same system and hyper-
parameters with no additional tuning across the distribution
shifts.
The image manifold as a prior: Our work improves on
the notion of GAN priors [57, 52], [8], [13] – the idea that
optimizing in the latent space of a pre-trained GAN provides
a powerful prior to solve several traditionally hard problems.
Yeh et al. [57] first introduced the projected gradient descent
(PGD) method with GANs for filling up arbitrary holes in an
image, in a semantically meaningful manner. Subsequently,
several efforts have pursued solving inverse problems us-
ing PGD, for example compressive recovery [13], [52], and
deblurring [8]. Asim et al. [8] proposed an alternative ap-
proach for image deblurring, wherein they used two separate
GANs – one for the blur kernel, and another for the images.
MimicGAN differs from this approach in that we make no
assumptions on the types of corruptions that can be recov-
ered, and hence requires only a single GAN for modeling the
image manifold. There have also been improvements to the
recovery of latent vectors for GANs [36], where it is shown
that stochastic clipping can provide more accurate projec-
tions. This technique works effectively on clean data, but
suffers from all the problems of PGD, in being non-robust.
At the same time, it is a generic approach which can be com-
bined with MimicGANfor improved performance. Finally,
MimicGAN is also related to iGAN [59], where the projec-
tion on the image manifold is used for user-guided image
manipulation. The projection is achieved by an encoder that
is trained at test time to find the right initialization in the
GAN latent space. We compare with iGAN in our experi-
ments, and show that while it is more robust than PGD, it is
susceptible to many of its weaknesses.
In addition to its effectiveness for image recovery, the GAN-
prior has also become a reasonably successful way to defend
against adversarial attacks – which are small perturbations
in the pixel space that are designed to cause a particular
classifier to fail dramatically. For example, Defense-GAN
[48], uses an approach called clean and classify, where the
observed adversarial example is projected on to the image
manifold, with the hope of eliminating the adversarial pertur-
bation in the process. A very related idea is explored in [27],
referred as Invert and Classify (INC), which also relies on
PGD similar to Defense-GAN. A similar approach proposes
to use the discriminator in addition to the generator to detect
adversarial examples [50], and we show in our experiments
that, in comparison, the MimicGANdefense is significantly
more robust. Interestingly, all the three aforementioned ap-
proaches become a special case of MimicGAN, when the
surrogate network in our approach is assumed to be iden-
tity. Note that, both Defense-GAN and MimicGAN are
applicable to white-box as well as black-box attacks, since
they do not need access to the classifier model in order to
clean the data. It should be noted that most existing GAN
based defenses are effective only when the attack is designed
purely on the classifier. However, recent evidence shows that
these defenses can be broken when the attack is designed
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Figure 2: MimicGAN: Illustration of the overall approach for projecting test images onto a known image manifold parameter-
ized using a GAN.
on the GAN and the classifier together [9]. We test Mim-
icGAN against such an attack and observe that, it is also
vulnerable to such a GAN-based attack, but to a lower degree
than existing GAN-based defense strategies.
Structural network priors Finally, our work is also re-
lated to the category of recent approaches that leverage the
prior afforded by an untrained neural network itself to solve
traditionally challenging inverse problems. The use of an
untrained surrogate network to estimate the corruption draws
inspiration from previous methods such as Deep Image Prior
[55] and Deep Internal Learning [53], which work directly
at test time. In the case of MimicGAN, the surrogate net-
work architecture imposes a structural prior on the types of
corruptions that can be recovered accurately, as described in
section 3.1.1.
3. Proposed Approach
In this section, we describe MimicGAN in detail, wherein
the core idea is to jointly obtain an estimate of the unknown
corruption process and perform projection via latent space
optimization. The proposed algorithm is generic in that it
can work with any type of generative model including the
families of GANs and variational autoencoders, as we make
no assumptions on the generator except that we are able to
sample from a latent space in a differentiable manner.
3.1. Formulation: Corruption-Mimicking for Robust
Projection
Let us denote the generator of a pre-trained GAN as
G : Rd 7→ I, where I represents the image manifold and
d is the dimensionality of the latent space. Assuming the
observation that needs to be projected onto I is given by
Y obs = f(X), where f(.) is some unknown corruption
function, and X ∈ I is the true image on the manifold.
Note that, f belongs to a broad class of functions includ-
ing geometric transformations (e.g. affine shift), missing
information (e.g. missing pixels), or a systematic distribu-
tional shift (e.g. changes to pixel intensities). The goal of
robust projection is to estimate X by projecting Y obs onto
I for a wide class of functions or corruptions, without any
prior knowledge about f or paired examples representing
the function. Formally, let Yobs = {Y obs1 , Y obs2 , . . . , Y obsN },
a small number of observations such that N > 1. These
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are assumed to be produced by a corruption process f along
with an unknown noise component, i.e., Y obsj = f (Xj ,Θf ),
where Xj’s are assumed to be i.i.d, drawn at random from
the image manifold parameterized by the generator G; and
Θf ∼ N (µf , σf ) correspond to the unknown corruption pa-
rameters, assumed to be drawn from a Gaussian with mean
and variance denoted by µf and σf respectively.
For e.g., µf could represent the parameters of an affine
transform, or even represent a non-linear distribution shift
(such as across datasets). In this formulation f can be inher-
ently stochastic, i.e., different observations can be corrupted
in slightly different ways. In the rest of the text we drop the
notation Θf for convenience.
Our main contribution in this paper is a technique called
corruption mimicking, that is able to estimate the likely cor-
ruption function while simultaneously projecting the obser-
vation onto the image manifold. We propose to parameterize
the corruption function by a neural network, fˆ , that “mim-
ics” the unknown corruption process, conditioned upon the
current best estimate of the projection Xˆ ∈ I. Next, we
estimate the best possible projection Xˆ conditioned on the
current estimate of the function fˆ . This alternating optimiza-
tion progresses by incrementally refining fˆ , while ensuring
that there always exists a valid solution Xˆ ∈ I, such that
fˆ(Xˆ) ≈ Y obs. The generator is kept frozen during the entire
optimization loop, and hence this is implemented as an en-
tirely test-time solution. Figure 2 shows an overview of the
proposed approach, and how the gradients are used to update
fˆ , and z respectively. Figure 1 shows an example of the
alternating optimization procedure, that demonstrates how
a better estimate of fˆ can lead to a reliable projection onto
I. In both the examples shown, the corruption function is
arbitrary cropping (“zoom in”) applied to the original image,
which the corruption surrogate, fˆ , captures within very few
iterations.
The proposed solution is applicable over a wide class of
functions f ∈ F , where F is the hypothesis space of cor-
ruption functions that can be modeled using the surrogate
neural network. For notational convenience, we use fˆ to
represent the corruption surrogate network, and Θˆ to repre-
sent its weights. Mathematically, we formulate corruption
mimicking as follows:
Θˆ∗, {z∗j }Nj=1 = arg min
Θˆ,{zj∈Rd}Nj=1
N∑
j=1
L
(
Y obsj , fˆ(G(zj), Θˆ)
)
,
(1)
Since both G and fˆ are differentiable, we can evaluate the
gradients of the objective in (1), using backpropagation and
utilize existing gradient based optimizers. In addition to com-
puting gradients with respect to zj , we also perform clipping
in order to restrict it within the desired range (e.g., [−1, 1])
resulting in a PGD-style optimization. Solving this alternat-
ing optimization problem produces high quality estimates
for both fˆ and the projections Xˆj = G(z∗j ) ∀j.
In the special case where the corruption function f is
known a priori, the projection problem can be simplified:
{z∗j }Nj=1 = arg min
{zj∈Rd}Nj=1
N∑
j=1
L (Y obsj , f(G(zj))) , (2)
where the optimal projections are given by Xˆj = G(z∗j ), L is
a loss function (e.g. mean squared error) for reconstructing
the observations using the known f and z ∈ Rd is the latent
noise vector. This is commonly adopted in several state-
of-the-art solutions for image inpainting [57], adversarial
defense [48], compressed sensing [13],[52], and deblurring
[8].
Equation (2), can be further simplified when we expect no
corruption or distributional shift by setting f = I, the identity
transformation, which reduces the problem to one of plain
projection. This is the most commonly used setting to obtain
projections of clean images using generators, sometimes
referred to as “inversion” of GANs [?, 36]. In the remainder
of the paper we refer to this setting as PGD.
{z∗j }Nj=1 = arg min
{zj∈Rd}Nj=1
N∑
j=1
L (Y obsj ,G(zj)) , (3)
While (2) can be highly effective when f is known, it fails
dramatically when f is unknown. In practice, this is often
handled by making a naïve assumption that f is identity as
in (3), and employing PGD. This tends to produce poor re-
sults under a wide-range of commonly occurring corruptions,
rendering the GAN essentially unusable in downstream ap-
plications.
3.1.1 Architecture of the corruption surrogate
The surrogate neural network plays a cruicial role in obtain-
ing robust projections. We use a spatial transformer layer
(STL) [29] first with the 6 parameters that model affine trans-
forms corresponding to scale, rotation and shearing. Next,
we include 4 convolutional layers, followed by a masking
layer with the mask being randomly initialized with the same
size of the image. The architecture is described in the Figure
3.
Justification for the architecture: The robustness af-
forded by MimicGAN corresponds to the class of functions
that can be expressed using the surrogate network, fˆ . Conse-
quently, we choose the layers based on commonly occuring
corruptions. The spatial transformer captures affine trans-
formations, as a result of which, we obtain robustness to
geometric corruptions such as scale, rotation, shift. Next,
convolutional layers with non-linearities allow us to model
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various image transformations such as blurs, edges, color
shifts etc. The masking layer allows us to model corruptions
such as arbitrary masks, missing pixels, noise, etc. Finally,
we create a short-cut connection [22] to make it easy for the
network to model the identity transformation. As a result,
MimicGAN can recover from corruptions corresponding to
either the specific types or different combinations of them,
for e.g. scaling and rotation, or scaling and masking etc.
Spatial Transformer
Conv (5,5,32) + ReLU
Conv (5,5,16) + ReLU
Conv (5,5,8) + TanH
Conv (5,5,3) + TanH
Mask (64,64,3)
X
Y
+
Figure 3: Architecture of surrogate network used to model
the distribution shift at test time. The same architecture
is used for CelebA, LFW and FFHQ datasets. The mask
acts independently on the RGB channels, as a multiplication
without any bias. The addition symbol implies a passthrough
that is just an addition operation, and we do not use any
non-linearity after the sum.
The architecture of the surrogate network chosen in this
work is based on “typical” corruptions we expect to see in
the wild. The layers in the network can be substituted based
on the application at hand, for example if one only expects
to see affine corruptions then a ST layer should suffice for
MimicGAN. More generally, by choosing the architecture
for the surrogate network, we are imposing a structural prior
on the kinds of corruptions MimicGAN can handle. As
a result, this can be a limitation if the corruption cannot
be modeled by existing CNN layers, like affine transforms
without the ST layer.
Given the highly underdetermined nature of this problem, in
many cases fˆ need not emulate the corruption exactly. Nev-
ertheless, the process of learning this surrogate sufficiently
regularizes the problem of computing the optimal projection.
The balance between updating fˆ and re-estimating the pro-
jection using PGD is critical to the convergence behavior.
Since fˆ is updated using a different set of images in each
iteration (due to updates in zj), it rarely demonstrates overfit-
ting behavior, even with as few as 2 observations. However,
we note that, overfitting can occur if the surrogate network
is made very deep, or there is only a single observation
(N = 1). We investigate this behaviour further in section
4.3.
3.1.2 Loss Function
Next we describe the construction of loss function L in (1),
which is comprised of two different terms:
(a) Corruption mimicking loss: Measures the discrep-
ancy between the true observations Y obsj and the esti-
mates from MimicGAN,
Lobs =
N∑
j=1
∥∥∥Y obsj − fˆ(G(zj))∥∥∥
1
,
where ‖.‖1 is the `1 norm. We observed that the `2
norm works reasonably as well.
(b) Adversarial loss: Using the discriminator D and the
generator G from the pre-trained GAN, we measure:
Ladv =
N∑
j=1
log(1−D(G(zj)).
Note, this is the same as the generator loss used for
training a GAN.
Given these components, the overall loss is defined as:
L = Lobs + λadvLadv, (4)
where λadv is kept fixed at 1e− 4. Note that, the projected
gradient descent (PGD) technique [57, 48] can be derived
as a special case of our approach, when f = I, where I is
identity. Also note that since the surrogate can never per-
fectly learn the identity function, MimicGAN will slightly
underperform PGD in cases where there is no corruption, i.e.
when the corruption is identity.
3.1.3 Algorithm
The procedure to perform the alternating optimization is
shown in Algorithm 1. We run the inner loops for updating fˆ
and zj for T1 and T2 number of iterations respectively. The
projection operation denoted by P is the clipping operation,
where we restrict the zj’s to lie in the range [−1, 1]. We use
the RMSProp Optimizer to perform the gradient descent step
in each case, with learning rates of γs and γg for the two
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Algorithm 1: MimicGAN
Input : Observed Images Yobs, Pre-trained
generator G and discriminator D.
Output : Recovered Images Xˆ ∈ I, Surrogate fˆ
Initialize : For all j, zˆj is initialized as average of 1000
realizations drawn from U(−1, 1)// see
text
Initialize :Random initialization of surrogate
parameters, Θˆ
for t← 1 to T do
for t1 ← 1 to T1 // update surrogate
do
Y estj ← fˆ
(
G(zˆj); Θˆ
)
, ∀j;
Compute loss L using (4);
Θˆ← Θˆ− γs ∇Θˆ(L);
end
for t2 ← 1 to T2 // perform PGD
conditioned on surrogate
do
Y estj ← fˆ
(
G(zˆj); Θˆ
)
, ∀j;
Compute loss L using (4);
zˆj ← zˆj − γg ∇z(L), ∀j;
zˆj ← P (zˆj) ∀j;
end
end
return fˆ , {Xˆj = G(zˆj), ∀j}.
steps respectively. Note that, since our approach requires
only the observations Yobs to compute the projection, it
lends itself to a task-agnostic inference wherein the user
does not need to specify the type of corruption or acquire
examples a priori.
3.1.4 Initialization
MimicGAN depends on an initial seed to begin the alter-
nating optimization, and we observed large variabilities in
convergence behavior due to the choice of the seed. In order
to avoid this, we initialize the estimate of projected images
by computing an average sample on the image manifold, by
averaging 1000 samples drawn from the random uniform
distribution. When the latent space is drawn from a uniform
distribution, this effectively initializes them with zero values.
Note that, we initialize the estimate for all observations with
the same mean image. We observe that this not only speeds
up convergence, but is also stable across several random
seeds. There are more sophisticated initialization techniques
such as in iGAN [59], however, these are effective under
little or no corruptions, and fail severely otherwise. Zero-
initialization also works just as effectively on the GANs
considered here, but the proposed averaging technique is
applicable more generally if latent space distributions are
not zero-centered.
4. Robustness Experiments
In this section, we demonstrate how corruption-
mimicking with MimicGAN improves projection quality
across various deformations and transformations of a held-
out test set, not accessed by the GAN during training. As
described in the previous section, we assume that the GAN
has been trained on clean or un-corrupted data. In addition,
we expect the corrupted images to be available only at test
time, with no prior knowledge on the corruption function.
For all empirical evaluation in this section, we measure the
projection error as:
dproj = ||Xgt − G(zˆ∗)||2, (5)
where Xgt is the ground truth (i.e., test images with no cor-
ruptions, like exactly matching crop and rotation settings at
train time) and zˆ∗ is the latent vector obtained upon conver-
gence of the proposed algorithm 1. Next, we describe the
different transformations and distortions considered for this
study, along with experiment details.
Experiment Setup: We perform all our robustness exper-
iments on the CelebA Faces dataset [39] which contains
202, 599 images. We crop each image by 147 pixels, from
the center of the image, and resize each image to be of size
64 × 64. We use the DCGAN [46] architecture, which is
trained on 90% of the images, while the rest 10% are used
for evaluation. Following [46], we rescale all the images to
be in the range of [−1, 1]. Finally, we train the GANs on
the original, clean images, and introduce corruptions only at
test time. Note, all our experiments were carried out using
TensorFlow [4]. To corrupt the samples in each experiment,
we draw random samples from the test set, followed up ap-
plying the same corruption on all of them, for simplicity.
MimicGAN can work even when each sample is corrupted
with slightly different parameters, where for e.g., each image
is rotated by Θf ∼ N (µf , σf ). We test MimicGAN in this
more challenging setting with adversarial defense experi-
ment in section 5.2, and show it is still robust.
Hyperparameters: In general, we find MimicGAN to be
generally stable to hyper-parameter choices in algorithm 1.
In particular, the results reported were obtained with the fol-
lowing settings: T1 = 25, T2 = 25, γs = 1e−2, γg = 1e−2.
Though these can be refined for different datasets, we ob-
served these settings to produce consistent performance in
all cases. It is important to note that in all the following
experiments, the held-out set is directly presented to Mimic-
GAN without any additional tuning or training.
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no rotation
(a) Robustness to rotations
Crop too 
extreme
Crop size matches 
training set
(b) Robustness to scale
Highly sensitive
no corruption
(c) Projections under missing pixels
Lesser context (harder)
(d) Projections under missing context
Figure 4: Reprojection error: is shown here for 100 test images, along with its standard deviation. In all the four challenging
cases considered here, MimicGAN significantly outperforms the baselines, which are widely used to explore the latent space
of a GAN.
Baselines: Following the state-of-practice, we compare
MimicGAN against these baseline techniques:
Projected Gradient Descent (PGD): This is a special
case of MimicGAN when the surrogate, f ≈ I is identity.
We fixed the learning rate for projected gradient descent
at 5e − 3. Note that, PGD has been successfully used
in several applications involving GANs [8, 13, 52, 57].
The optimal projection is given by G(z∗), where z∗ =
arg min
{z∈Rd}
||Yobs − G(z)||, where we drop the sample index
for convenience. This is the same as described in eq (3).
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(a) Robustness to rotations (arrow indicates setting used during training)
(b) Robustness to scale (arrow indicates setting used during training)
(c) Robustness to missing pixels.
(d) Robustness to missing contextual information.
Figure 5: Qualitative results demonstrating the invariance properties for different test images under all the corruptions consid-
ered here. Here, each image is from a different run with the specified corruption setting, and we see that MimicGAN provides
significantly better reprojection error in all cases above.
9
ResNet + PGD: We repeat PGD, but this time compute
loss in the feature space from a pre-trained ResNet-50
[22]. A version of this idea with VGG features has been
used in [24], but we observed improved performance with
ResNet features compared to VGG. We expect this to be
a better baseline than simply using raw pixel intensities,
since the ResNet has been trained on ImageNet [47], that
include a wide range of image variations. However, it has
been previously reported that even complex models such
as the ResNet fail to generalize to even small perturbations
[10]. The optimal projection in this case is given by G(z∗),
where z∗ = arg min
{z∈Rd}
||R(Yobs)−R(G(z))||, whereR(x)
extracts ResNet-50 features corresponding to the image
x. We follow [59], and include a mixture of losses in both
pixel space (like PGD) and ResNet feature space with a
weight of 1e− 3.
iGAN [59] : Interactive-GAN learns an encoder on the
fly to determine the best projection. We use an encoder
with similar architecture as the discriminator except the
last layer that contains the appropriate number of neurons
as the latent dimension. This network, E(Y obs, θE) :
I 7→ Rd is trained given observations Y obs such that the
optimal projection is given by: G(E(Y obs, θ∗E)), where
θ∗E = arg min
θE
||G(E(Y obs, θE))− Y obs||.
BIGAN/ALI [16], [17]: This is a technique that learns
an encoder to map into the latent space directly, while
training the GAN. Considering our final goal is to project
onto the image manifold, one can use the learned encoder
directly. The optimal projection is obtained by passing
the image through the encoder and the decoder directly as
G(E(Y obs)), where E is the encoder in the BIGAN.
In all cases, we measure the quality of projection as the
error between the original image, and the one obtained
from the generator after encoding. We also use the same
pre-trained GAN in all the baselines, with the only factor
of variation being the projection technique.
4.1. Robustness to Affine Transforms
In this experiment, we study how MimicGAN can be
used to obtain scale and shift invariant projections on the
image manifold. These form the most common type of cor-
ruptions one can expect to observe in the wild. We consider
two such transformations: (a) scale: where we provide more
context of the image (“zooming out”) than what the GAN
has observed during training, and (b) rotation: here we rotate
the images with a small crop to avoid edge artifacts. As
we will demonstrate, even these seemingly simple transfor-
mations can significantly throw-off modern deep learning
systems, unless they have appeared in the training set [10].
MimicGAN provides robustness to these transformations
over a wide range as shown in Figures 4b and4a respectively.
We chose 100 random examples from the held-out test set,
and compared the projection error (mean and standard devi-
ation) obtained for different amounts of scaling or rotation.
It is obvious from these plots that the baseline techniques
are extremely sensitive to even small changes in these set-
tings. In comparison, MimicGAN demonstrates invariant
properties over a large magnitude of perturbations. Addi-
tionally, in figures 5b and 5a we show examples of all crops
and rotations on a particular test image, and demonstrate the
effectiveness of MimicGAN. Note the canonical setting used
during the training is marked with an arrow. An interesting
observation from these figures is that all baseline methods
fail somewhat differently.
4.2. Projections with missing or partial information
Next, we study the robustness of MimicGAN to missing
information or lack of complete context while projecting
onto the manifold. Specifically, we consider two commonly
observed cases: (a) Missing pixels: Here we randomly drop
pixels from the image, with the number of missing pixels
varied between 0−60%. (b) Zoom-in: We intentionally leave
out a lot of context from the original image by cropping very
close to the face. In both these cases, obtaining an accurate
projection is an ill-posed inverse problem since there can be
infinitely many solutions for the same observation, especially
in cases when the corruption is extreme. We show that,
even in this ill-posed setting, MimicGAN is able to provide
meaningful and highly plausible projections.
Projection results obtained under these corruptions are
showed in Figures 5c and 5d respectively. Quantitative re-
sults obtained by averaging the errors over 100 randomly
chosen test examples are shown in Figures 4c, and 4d. We ob-
serve that while BIGAN fails easily with even small amounts
of missing pixels. On the other hand, PGD appears to be
more stable, but eventually fails beyond 40% missing pixels.
In comparison, MimicGAN remains robust at a much higher
level of corruption, and produces lower projection errors.
4.3. Properties of MimicGAN
Finally, we study how MimicGAN performs under dif-
ferent conditions when the number of observations vary,
computational time, and how it generlizes to larger images
of size 128× 128.
Relationship to number of observations Since the surro-
gate network is central to MimicGAN, the number of avail-
able observations is expected to play an important role in the
quality of projection. To quantify this relationship, we take
a total of 128 images from the CelebA dataset and project
them using MimicGAN by varying the batch size as follows
– [1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32, 64, 128]. We compare two metrics:
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(a) Quality of projection under different number of observations. The high variance in projection
with just a single observation is due to both an overfit surrogate and the identifiability issues
arising from not being able to tell apart the underlying true signal from the corruption
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Figure 6: Properties of MimicGAN: (a) Number of observations vs quality of projection, and corruption mimicking. (b)
Robustness properties generalize to larger images and (c) Time taken to compute the projection compared to different baselines.
quality of reprojection (same as eqn. (5)) and corruption
mimicking error, which is the same as the optimization cost
defined in equation (1). Ideally, we want both to be as small
as possible.
In Figure 6a, we show the results for this experiment, where
the corruption considered is rotation. We observe that, as
expected with more observations the quality improves. How-
ever, we note that 8-10 samples are typically sufficient to
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recover the same projection error as 100 observations. More-
over, with a single observation the surrogate overfits leading
to low corruption mimicking error, but a high reprojection
error. The high variance in the reprojection error is explained
by the fact that when only a single observation is available,
we run into an identifiability issue – i.e., MimicGAN can
no longer distinguish what the corruption was from the orig-
inal image. We note we obtain better reprojection error, and
higher visual quality of images even with just 2 observa-
tions when compared to a competitive baseline, which is
ResNet+PGD.
Time Complexity Trade-Off Naturally, using a surrogate
network leads to a computational burden when compared
with vanilla PGD because of training the surrogate. In Figure
6c, we show the time taken to project 100 random samples
for images of size 64× 64, and 128× 128. We compute the
time taken per iteration for each of the methods, on the same
NVIDIA P100 GPU with 16GB of memory. We observe that,
as expected, MimicGAN tends to take ∼ 2x the time than
PGD, but is significantly faster than iGAN or ResNet+PGD
in both sizes of images. This is primarily because computing
ResNet features becomes the bottleneck in these methods.
Generalization to larger images We also show that ro-
bust projection can be achieved with larger images, using
exactly the same surrogate model (adjusted for size) and
hyper parameter settings. We see similar robustness advan-
tages even for these images. In Figure 6b, we show how
MimicGAN provides robust projections at 128× 128 sized
images, when the corruption is an unknown rotation.
5. Applications of Robust Projection
In this section, we study how robust projections can lead
to performance gains in different applications involving
GANs. The idea of projecting onto a known image man-
ifold has been leveraged in applications such as adversarial
defense [48, 27, 50], anomaly detection [58, 6, 7], domain
adaptation, etc. We use the following experiments to verify
our hypothesis that a more robust projection can make GAN
based solutions more effective in these applications.
5.1. Distribution Alignment
An important application of GANs has been in the con-
text of handling distribution shifts across datasets, and we
evaluate the effectiveness of MimicGAN in solving this
challenging problem. First, we consider the problem of
projecting face images onto a manifold inferred using face
datasets characterized by systematic distributional shifts. For
example, projecting a child’s face using GANs trained ex-
tensively using adult faces is quite challenging in practice.
Subsequently, we consider the problem of unsupervised do-
main adaptation, which attempts to leverage labeled data
from a source dataset to build a classifier for an unlabeled
target dataset, when there is an unknown distributional shift
between the two datasets.
5.1.1 Adapting Face GANs
In this application, we consider three different face image
datasets, namely CelebA, LFW [11] and FFHQ [30], and
evaluate the quality of projecting faces from one dataset onto
GANs trained using another dataset. With existing tech-
niques, the projection operation can completely fail unless
we know a priori how to normalize the distribution shift,
which is challenging in practice. Instead, we show how
MimicGAN can help in accounting for this distribution shift
such that any relevant GAN “backend” can be used without
loss of functionality.
Datasets:
1. LFW: A combination of PubFig83 [45] and Labelled
Faces in the Wild (LFW) aligned dataset [26], following
[11]. This dataset contains 25,068 images of celebrities.
We use the original settings proposed in this paper, and
use a crop of 200 that only contains the close up of
faces, followed by resizing them to be 64× 64.
2. FFHQ: [30] contains 70,001 images scraped from
Flickr, at multiple resolutions, and we use the thumb-
nail version with images of size 128× 128 without any
additional crops or resizing.
Note that, for all datasets, we used a DCGAN architecture
similar to the one described in Section 5.1.2. The only
difference was in the case of FFHQ, wherein we included an
additional layer to both the generator and discriminator to
account for the change in image size (128× 128). In Figure
7b, we illustrate the results obtained by projecting CelebA
faces onto an LFW GAN. For comparison, we also show the
corresponding projections obtained using the baseline PGD
in figure 7a. It is seen that PGD tries to identify images that
exactly match the given inputs, which, if the mode doesn’t
exist in the distribution, result in sub-optimal projections. In
contrast, MimicGAN produces significantly higher quality
projections by automatically accounting for the distribution
shifts. As applicable, we either upsample or downsmple the
source images to maintain the same size as the target dataset.
5.1.2 Unsupervised Domain Adaptation
The task considered here is the alignment between two re-
lated yet distinct domains (source and target), while building
a classifier for the target without access to any labeled data.
For this experiment, we use the commonly benchmarked pair
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(a) CELEBA→LFW: MimicGAN robustness to distribution shifts as seen here, where the standard projected gradient
descent (PGD) completely fails to recover accurate projections.
(b) Mix ’n Match: MimicGAN provides the flexibility to use different GANs for datasets other than what was used
during training.
Figure 7: Here we show projections obtained with MimicGAN, i.e. G(z∗), from three datasets CelebA [39], FFHQ [30], and
LFW [45], where held out samples are projected onto GANs trained on each of these datasets. The images to be projected
are randomly chosen from each of the datasets. It can be seen that MimicGAN provides very meaningful projections across
distributions, without explicitly knowing how these datasets are related to each other.
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of domains in handwritten digit recognition, namely MNIST
and USPS. We argue distribution alignment can be seen as
essentially projecting the target data onto a source data man-
ifold. This task is challenging due to unknown variations in
scale, skew, rotation, and other statistical properties across
these two domains, causing existing projection techniques to
fail. In contrast, MimicGAN can project varied datasets onto
each other with ease, which we exploit for the problem of
unsupervised domain adaptation. We follow the experiment
setup in several domain adaptation works in the literature,
and show its effectiveness under a 1-NN and a more complex
CNN classifier.
Setup: We follow the setup in [51], where we perform adap-
tation on the entire 65000 digits of MNIST and 9298 digits
of USPS. We resized the MNIST digits to 16x16 so they
are the same size as the latter, and used the following hyper-
parameter settings: U → M : T1 = 25, T2 = 75, γs =
1e − 2, γg = 8e − 2, and M → U : T1 = T2 = 15, γs =
1e− 2, γg = 9e− 3. We perform the projection in batches
of size 1000 at a time for efficiency. These hyper-parameters
are not very sensitive, and are chosen here based on a valida-
tion set of 100 images.
Baselines: We compare the performance of MimicGAN in
distribution alignment with the following baselines:
• No Adaptation: Here we use a nearest neighbor classi-
fier trained on the source dataset directly on the target
dataset.
• PGD: We compare performance when no corruption-
mimicking is performed, with the same GAN backend
used by MimicGAN .
• Subspace Alignment [18] A classical domain adpata-
tion approach that aligns two distributions based on
a single subspace that minimizes the Forbenius norm
between the target and the subspace aligned source.
The source aligned coordinate system is given by
Xa = XSX
′
SXT , where XS is the subspace fit to
the source dataset, and XT the subspace of the target
dataset.
• Large Scale Optimal Transport (OT) [51] A recent tech-
nique that leverages an efficient version of optimal trans-
port to align large datasets.
Additionally, we compare the performance of MimicGAN to
more recent domain adaptation approaches in Table 1. For
this we follow standard protocol and train a CNN on the
source dataset and test it on the aligned target dataset, we
verify that our no adaptation numbers are very close to those
reported in most recent papers.
Results: We show the results of projection for both datasets
in Figures 8a, and 8b, and it is clearly evident that corruption-
mimicking significantly improves the quality of projection
as compared to PGD. We note that PGD never recovers the
true samples from the target distribution, and only recovers
those images very similar to those the GAN has previously
seen. We also quantitatively evaluate the 1-NN classifier per-
formance after performing the alignment using MimicGAN.
Table 1 shows that alignment under MimicGAN is superior
to even large scale optimal transport [51], which computes
a sample-wise alignment between two entire distributions.
More importantly, using MimicGAN improves perfromance
over PGD by nearly 20 and 30 percentage points in MNIST
to USPS, and USPS to MNIST respectively. This significant
boost is attributed solely to the improved quality of projec-
tion while accessing the target distribution directly at test
time, making it a viable domain generalization technique.
For the CNN based methods, it should be noted that the
current state of the art methods in domain adaptation are all
task-specific adaptation, i.e. the alignment is closely tied to
the classifier, and uses labels from the source domain. On
the other hand, MimicGAN aligns the distribution in a task-
agnostic manner, i.e. with no knowledge of either the CNN
classifier or the source labels. As a result, MimicGAN is
inferior to the existing task-specific methods, as expected.
However, it is worth noting that among the task-agnostic
methods (pure distribution alignment), MimicGAN obtains
the highest adaptation accuracy.
5.2. Adversarial Defense
Here we study how MimicGAN, by design, can provide
effective defense against several state-of-the-art adversarial
attacks. We argue that a robust projection onto the image
manifold results in very effective cleaning of adversarial data.
In this context, the MimicGAN defense can be viewed as a
generalization of the recent GAN-based defenses [48, 27, 50]
that assume the corruption function fˆ to be identity, similar
to the PGD baseline. The more recent Cowboy defense
[50] uses an additional adversarial loss term to the defense-
GAN loss [48] with the discriminator (We implement it with
λadv = 1e−3).
We consider a variety of strong attacks to benchmark our
defense, and we find that in every single case the Mimic-
GAN defense is significantly stronger than existing tech-
niques. While we outperform Defense-GAN[48], we retain
its advantages – i.e, the MimicGAN defense is a test-time
only algorithm that does not require any additional training.
It is also entirely unsupervised, and does not need knowledge
of the classifier prior to deploying the defense, thus leading
to a practical defense strategy.
Setup: We use a CNN classifier that achieves a test accu-
racy of 91.50% on the Fashion-MNIST dataset [56]. We
design a variety of attacks using the cleverhans toolbox [43],
and test our defense on this classifier for all the following
experiments. The proposed defense involves the projection
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(a) USPS→MNIST
(b) MNIST→USPS
Figure 8: MimicGAN allows for accurate projection under distribution shifts, as shown here with MNIST and USPS datasets.
The images to be projected are randomly chosen from the other dataset, and we show G(z∗) here. The domain adaptation
results on the full 65000 MNIST and 9298 USPS digits are shown in Table 1.
operation, following algorithm 1, where the unknown cor-
ruptions are adversarial perturbations. The performance of
different defense strategies is measured using 500 randomly
chosen test images from the dataset, which are cleaned in
batches of size 100. We use the following hyper-parameter
settings T1 = 10, T2 = 10, γs = 1e − 2, γg = 8e − 2 that
are determined using a validation set of 100 examples. We
observe that, as before, these settings are not very sensitive,
and remain effective over a large range of values.
Universal perturbations: MimicGAN also provides ef-
fective defense against universal perturbations [41, 3], which
belong to the class of image-agnostic perturbations where
an attack is just a single vector which when added to the
entire dataset can fool a classifier. To test this defense, we
first design a targeted universal perturbation using the Fast
Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [21], by computing the mean
adversarial perturbation fromN = 15 test images, i.e. for an
adversarially perturbed image X˜ , we define the universal per-
turbation to be νu =
∑
i(Xi− X˜)/N . We can also increase
the magnitude of the attack by scaling it: X˜u = X + ανu.
Typically, a larger magnitude implies a stronger attack up
to a certain point after which it becomes noise and reduces
to a trivial attack. In Figure 9(a), we observe that when
compared to the state-of-the-art Defense-GAN, our defense
is significantly more robust.
Image-dependent attacks: We test MimicGAN’s defense
against the following image-specific attacks: (a) The Carlini-
Wagner L2 attack (CWL) [15], (b) Fast Gradient Sign
Method (FGSM) [21], (c) Projected Gradient Descent
Method (PGDM) [40], (d) DeepFool [42], (e) Basic Iter-
ative Method (BIM) [32] and (f) Obfuscated Gradients [9].
We hypothesize that even though the perturbation on each
image is different, the surrogate learns an average perturba-
tion when presented with a few adversarial examples. As
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Method M→ U U→M
1-
N
N
Ta
sk
A
gn
os
tic
No Adaptation 71.26 31.65
PGD 58.15 24.96
Subspace Alignment [18] 59.53 44.61
Large Scale OT [51] 77.92 60.50
MimicGAN (ours) 80.75 65.50
C
N
N
No Adaptation 81.6 60.3
PGD 61.7 48.2
MimicGAN (ours) 83.7 63.3
Ta
sk
Sp
ec
ifi
c
CoGAN [38] 91.2 89.1
ADDA [54] 92.4 93.8
Gen to Adapt [49] 95.3 90.8
DANN [19] 95.7 90.0
CyCADA [23] 95.6 96.5
Table 1: An application of distribution alignment in unsupervised domain adaptation (UDA). MimicGAN outperforms many
task-agnostic alignment strategies, i.e. methods that do not have access to source as well as target labels, using a pixel-based
1-nearest neighbor (1-NN) classifier, as well as a convolutional neural network (CNN). For context, we also compare with
recent task-specific adaptation techniques.
(a) Universal Perturbations [41]
Attack No Defense Cowboy [50] Defense GAN [48] MimicGAN (Ours)
BIM [32] 05.60 66.00± 3.47 68.46± 3.12 72.20± 3.80
DF [42] 06.20 71.43± 4.72 78.86± 1.36 82.40± 3.81
FGSM [21] 11.60 61.60± 4.99 65.93± 2.44 67.60± 2.83
CWL [15] 00.40 68.80± 3.84 71.67± 3.16 75.00± 4.38
PGDM [40] 05.40 65.20± 5.14 69.90± 2.17 75.73± 4.35
Obfuscated [9] (attack in-
cludes GAN)
26.93± 4.29 27.73± 4.50 27.26± 2.49 31.06± 4.01
(b) Popular Adversarial Perturbations
Figure 9: Adversarial Defense: MimicGAN defense shows significantly higher robustness to several strong adversarial
attacks. Performance on clean test data is 91.5%. Here, we show the average defense on adversarial attacks obtained using 3
different GANs on the same dataset. Across the board we see that MimicGANprovides a stronger defense, even in the case of
Obfuscated Gradients Attack [9], where the GAN is included in designing the adversarial attack.
seen in Table 9(b), this turns out to be a strong regularization,
resulting in a significantly improved defense compared to
baseline approaches such as Defense-GAN [48] or Cowboy
[50]. We use the same GAN backend for these baselines
so that the only variable in the adversarial defence is the
projection technique. The defence performance reported in
Figure 9(b) is obtained using 3 separate GAN backends that
are trained with random subsets containing 45000 images
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or ∼ 80% of the MNIST training set, to ensure they result
in sufficiently different GANs. The obfuscated attack [9] is
the strongest attack considered here as it targets the GAN in
addition to the classifier, we attack all the three GANs and
report the performance. While MimicGAN is vulnerable to
such an attack, it can afford a stronger defense than plain
GAN-based defenses, as seen in Table 9(b).
5.3. Anomaly Detection
GANs have become a popular choice for unsupervised
anomaly detection since out of distribution samples are rep-
resented as those samples with a relatively high reprojec-
tion error, since they are not well represented by the image
manifold inferred by the generator. A typical experimen-
tal setup [58, 6, 7] for a k class dataset is to train a GAN
on k − 1 classes, and use the kth class as the anomaly -
this is repeated for every class. We test the effectiveness of
MimicGAN in such a task, which we expect to improve
with more robust projections. We also compare our method
with recent manifold-projection based anomaly detection
techniques [7, 6, 58].
Experimental Details: We perform the anomaly detection
task on the MNIST digits training set, where we leave one
class out and train a GAN on the remaining classes. We use
the same hyper-parameters used in the domain adaptation
setting described in section 5.1.2. The training set contains
80% of the normal data, and the test set contains the re-
maining 20% of the normal, along with all the anomalous
class samples, similar to [58]. We use the final projection
error given in eq. (5) to distinguish normal samples from
anomalous ones, the hypothesis being that a normal sample
should have a significantly lower error than one that is out
of distribution. Though some recent approaches have also
used distance in the feature space of the discriminator as a
measure for detection, we found the projection error to be
more effective. We compute the area under the ROC curve
as the evaluation metric for detection performance.
Table 2 shows the average detection performance across
all 10 classes in the MNIST dataset, in comparison to several
recent techniques. We see that using corruption-mimicking
with MimicGAN significantly improves detection perfor-
mance. In addition, we match the performance of a state-of-
the-art technique specifically designed for anomaly detection,
simply through robust reprojection. It is also worth noting
that over our baseline approach, PGD, MimicGAN increases
detection performance by nearly 30 percentage points.
6. Discussions and Future Work
In this paper, we presented MimicGAN, an entirely un-
supervised system that can accurately project images back
onto the image manifold even in presence of a variety of
Figure 10: MimicGAN for anomaly detection using a leave
one class out setup. Here, the class indicated as the anomaly
is left out during training a GAN. Next, the anomalous class
is reprojected onto this GAN. We expect a better projec-
tion technique to identify out-of-distribution samples more
effectively.
Method Area under
ROC
VAE[7] 0.34±0.18
AnoGAN[7] 0.44±0.07
GANomaly (BIGAN) [6] 0.78 ±
0.11
EGBAD (PGD baseline) [58] 0.50±0.13
MimicGAN (ours) 0.78 ±
0.14
Table 2: Anomaly Detection on MNIST leave-one-class
out experiment. Average performance on all 10 classes is
reported below. Corruption mimicking boosts PGD by 30%
to match state of the art techniques.
unknown corruptions. We achieve this by introducing a cor-
ruption mimicking surrogate network, in addition to finding
a solution in the latent space of a generative model with-
out any additional data augmentation or supervision. The
properties of the surrogate network enables robustness to
a variety of corruptions, for example we show that a sur-
rogate with a spatial transformer layer provides robustness
to affine transformations. We show that by improving the
robustness of projections across these corruptions, a huge
boost in performance can be obtained in a wide variety of
applications leveraging generative priors such as: adversar-
ial defense, domain adaptation, and anomaly detection. The
results in this study indicate that such learned priors can
17
be much more powerful than previously understood when
coupled with robust projection strategies.
There are several avenues of future study, particularly with
respect to the surrogate network which is central to Mim-
icGAN. For applications like domain adaptation, including
available supervision in the source domain may lead to im-
proved task-specific alignment, thereby improving adapta-
tion quality. Next, since the surrogate network is trained at
test time with a few observations, it maybe easy to break it
using few adversarial examples, that are crafted with knowl-
edge of the surrogate network. The current framework can-
not handle such shifts and will require generilzations that can
provide reliable projections even under adversally perturbed
observations. Exploring how robust projections improve
problems in inverse imaging remains to be addressed. In
this regard, a variational projection can also be useful in
recovering multiple plausible solutions to under-determined
inverse problems.
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